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Cambridge SUMMARY 
If the US trade deficit  remains around its present  level for a few 
more  years  it  will  generate  an  exploding  growth  in  overseas 
indebtedness  which  will  imperatively  demand  correction  at  some 
stage. The longer the correction  is postponed, the more intractable 
the problem  will become  both  for the US and,  indirectly,  for the 
rest  of  the  world.  While  the  internal  (budget)  and  external 
deficits  are obviously not "twins", they are related to one another 
in  a  way  which  makes  it  impossible  to  eliminate  one  without 
eliminating  the  other.  If  an  attempt  were  made  to  balance  the 
budget  without  improving  America's  performance  in  international 
trade,  the consequences  for output and unemployment,  both at home 
and  abroad,  would  be extremely  unpleasant.  It is a pre-condition 
for  reducing  the  budget  deficit  without  generating  a depression 
that US exports rise substantially  relative to import penetration. 
'The  first  part  of  this  brief  reproduces  work  already 
published  in collaboration  with William Milberg 2 
THE  US BALANCE  OF PAYMENTS' 
Chart  1 shows the evolution of the US current balance  of payments 
during  the  last twenty four years. 
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Although  there have been large fluctuations in this balance, there 
has  been  a significant  tendency for it to deteriorate taking the 
period  as a whole, the trend being more clearly revealed  if the 
"one off" contributions by foreigners to the cost of the Gulf War 
are  shown  separately.  In the mid-seventies  there  was  a  surplus 
equal  to about  1% of GDP; in 1994 there was a deficit in excess of 
2%, which rose rapidly during the course of the year reaching 2.5% 
in the last quarter. 
*The current  balance  is taken to be "net foreign investment" 
as shown in Table 4.1 of the NIPA. There exists another definition 
of the current account balance which is normally about .2% of GDP 
more  in deficit  than the NIPA version. The NIPA version  is used 
here  because  it can be more  readily related to national  income 
concepts. CHART2 
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Chart  2 shows that two thirds of the deterioration in the current 
balance  was  the  result  of  a  fall in the  "primary"  balance of 
payments, a term used to describe the current balance excluding the 
net flow of interest and profits from abroad - "factor income" in 
the  jargon of the NIPA'. The distinction is useful because factor 
income in any period is predetermined by asset and liability stocks 
accumulated  in  earlier  periods,  together  with  their  rates  of 
return. 
The  trend  in the primary balance since the early  eighties would 
have been even worse were it notfor  the way oil 
the mid seventies and early eighties there were 
price  of oil which at the worst moment (in 1980) 
prices moved. In 
increases in the 
made the primary 
3 The primary balance  is slightly more  in deficit  than the 
balance  of trade in goods and services, differing only in that it 
includes unilateral transfers abroad - mainly personal remittances 
and foreign aid. 4 
balance  about  3%  of GDP worse than it would otherwise have been. 
Since then, the real price of oil has fallen by about 75%. Chart 3 
shows  the  primary  balance  as it was  and  as  it would  have been, 
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Fluctuations  in the primary balance about its deteriorating trend 
have mainly been the result of two factors. 
1)  The US business cycle has not been synchronised with that 
of her trading partners. There have been three periods  since the 
early  seventies  when US production rose relatively  fast  (1975-8, 
1980-85  and  1991-94) and three relatively slow periods  (1972-75, 
1978-82  and  1988-91).  As  Charts  2  and  3  show, +the  balance 
deteriorated  relatively fast during the periods of rapid expansion 
(as imports  rose fast relative to exports). The balance  improved 
when  the  US economy was relatively weak. 
2)  The  (trade weighted) dollar rate of exchange performed an 5 
extraordinary  roller  coaster,  rising  64%  between  1980  and  1985, 
then  falling  all the way back. The effect of these  fluctuations  has 
not  been  in  accordance  with  the  Story  commonly  told  in textbooks 
that  import  prices  and the terms  of trade  (the ratio  of export  to 
import  prices)  move roughly  one for one with  the exchange  rate.  In 
the event,  neither  import prices  nor the terms  of trade  changed  on 
anything  like  that  scale. 
Percent change  80-85  85-90 
___________-__--__---~~-~~~-~~~-~-----~~-----~~~_____________~____ 
Dollar  cost  of foreign  exchange  - 61.0  + 62.2 
Imports  of goods  & services  deflator  - 9.4  + 21.1 
Ditto  excluding  oil  - 0.7  + 21.7 
Terms  of trade  - 14.1  + 23.7 
Ditto  excluding  oil  - 4.1  + 12.9 
SOURCE:  CITIBASE.  The  chain  weighted  index  of  import  prices  -  a 
better  measure  of import prices  than the national  income deflator  - 
does  not  seem to exist prior  to 1982. However,  its movement  since 
1982 has not been so different  from the deflator  used  in the table 
above  as to  change  the broad  picture 
The  figures  show  that  import  prices  and  the  terms  of  trade  only 
changed  by  one  fifth,  or  less,  as  much  as  the  appreciation  and 
subsequent  devaluation  of  the  dollar.  Exporters  the  world  over 
shade  their  selling  prices  to  keep  or  increase  their  foothold  in 
the US, while  the prices  of many commodities  (for instance  oil) are 
not merely  dollar denominated  but  (to a significant  extent)  dollar 
determined.  Indeed  the  US  is such  a price  maker  that  the  cost  of 
devaluation  (whether  measured  in  terms  of  inflationary 
repercussions  or of  real  income  loss  t_hrough the  terms  of  trade 
effect)  looks  relatively  small  - certainly  much  smaller  than  in 
many  other  countries  - suggesting  that the inflationary  dangers  of 
devaluation  are habitually  over-estimated. 
Yet import prices did respond  in some degree  to the fluctuations  in 6 
the dollar,  and the fact that export  prices  measured  in dollars  did 
not  change  much  implies  that  export  prices  measured  in  foreign 
currency  - a more  relevant  factor  for the  determination  of export 
volumes  - changed  a great  deal;  they  rose  sharply  when  the dollar 
appreciated  in  1980-85  and  then  fell  back  sharply  in  1985-90. 
Foreign  trade  is quite  responsive  to  changes  in  relative  prices, 
and it is clear  that the fluctuations  in the dollar  did indeed have 
a significant  effect  on the primary  balance,  making  it worse  in the 
first  half  of the eighties  and then improving  it again.  For what it 
is  worth,  my  estimate  is  that  the  rise  and  fall  in  the  dollar 
caused  about  half':,  or perhaps  a little more,  of the deterioration 
of  the  primary  balance  between  1980  and  1985  and  also  of  the 
subsequent  improvement  between  1985 and  1990'. 
THE FALL  IN FACTOR  INCOME  FROM ABROAD 
If two  thirds  of the  deterioration  in the  current  balance  during 
the  last  twenty  years  can  be  explained  by  changes.*in the primary 
4 Martin  Feldstein  (1993)  states  that  the  move  of  the  US 
current  account  into de--  ficit  in the first half  of the eighties  and 
the  subsequent  recovery  was all, or nearly  all, the consequence  of 
the  rise  and  subsequent  fall  in  the  dollar.  But  this  is  a 
conclusion  that  can  only  be  reached  after  careful  statistical 
analysis.  Is  Feldstein  doing more than exercise  his  intuition?  The 
US  economy  expanded  relatively  fast  in  the  first  half  of  the 
eighties  when  the deficit  was expanding  and that  it was going  into 
recession  in  the  subsequent  period  when  the  deficit  was 
contracting.  It seems  unquestionable,  in view  of the  US  appetite 
for  imports,  that  the  US business  cycle  had  somethina  to do with 
the fluctuating  current  account deficit.  It would be interesting  to 
know how Feldstein  explains  the recent deterioration  in the current 
account  (at least  2% of  GDP  since  1992) bringing  about  a deficit 
within  sight  of the mid-eighties  trough,  at a time  when the dollar 
has  been  falling. 
j  This  conclusion  is not mere  guesswork;  it is derived  from 
a  model  which  uses  estimated  responses  of  relative  prices  to 
changes  in  the  exchange  rate  and  of  trade  volumes  to  relative 
prices  and growth  rates. The actual trade balance  was then compared 
with what_  the model predicted  on the assumption  that there had been 
no  change  in the exchange  rate. balance, there remains one third to be explained by the fact that, 
as  US  foreign  wealth  melted  away  (a direct  consequence  of  the 
7 
persistent deficits), the flow of factor income dwindled from 1% of 
GDP in the early seventies to nothing at the end of 1993. 
Chart 4 shows how US foreign wealth fell from 30% of GDP in 1970 to 
minus  8% at the end of 1993. The fall in the net stock of wealth 
did not equal the current account deficit on a year to year basis 
because  of  exchange  rate and  stock exchange  fluctuations  which 
changed the value of assets and liabilities. However, the fall in 
net wealth was roughly equal to the sum of the balance of payments 
deficits  taking the period as a whole and this gives some broad 
confirmation that the figures are coherent. The slight improvement 
in 1993 was caused by a favourable moveRlent  in foreign relative to 
domestic  stock prices which raised the value of US owned assets 
abroad relative to foreign owned assets in the US. 
At first sight there is a paradox because, as Chart 4 shows, the 
net stock of overseas assets turned negative in 1988, yet the net 8 
flow  of factor income, shown in Chart 2, remained positive during 
the five subsequent years. Perhaps it is for this reason that so 
little  importance  has  so  far  been  paid  to  the  US's  growing 
indebtedness.  It  was only in 1994 that net factor income actually 
became negative, the outflow rising to  [.25]% of GDP in the third 
quarter. 
The  paradox  is  easily  resolved  if  factor  income  flows  are 
disaggregated  and  set  alongside  the  asset  and  liability  stocks 
which generated them.  It turns out that one substantial block of 
foreign owned assets - direct investments by foreigners 
has hardly been earning any return at all. 
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It  would  be  convenient  if the  prim&y  deficit  could  always be 
financed by foreigners making wretched direct investments in the US 
which  earn next to nothing! But this is, in reality, out of the 
question. For one thing, as Chart 5 illustrates, the increase in 
the US's net foreign indebtedness has largely taken the form, not 
of  inward  direct  investment,  but  of  increasing  financial 9 
liabilities. And this is exactly what is to be expected given that 
the deficit is the consequence of the US'S voracious appetite for 
imports rather than the harmless counterpart of foreigners finding 
worthy  investment opportunities in the US. For another thing, the 
very  poor  return  on  foreign  direct  investment  may  not  last 
indefinitely.  According  to  the  analysis  by  David  S. Laster and 
Robert  N. McCauley  in the December  1993 Quarterly  Review of the 
Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York,  the  10~  return  is  mainly  a 
consequence  of  these  investments  having  been  made  relatively 
recently;  it seems that a period of running in is necessary before 
reasonable  levels of profitability can be established. Perhaps as 
foreign entrepreneurs get their sea legs  profitability will rise  to 
more normal levels, generating an increased outflow of significant 
size.  [Preliminary figures for 1994 suggest that this may already 
have started..... 
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Chart  6 shows that, unlike the returns on direct investment, the 
returns  to  financial assets and liabilities - bonds  etc. - have 10 
quite closely tracked the movement of interest rates. The coherence 
of interest rates with the movements of factor income generated  by 
financial  assets will prove Very useful when  it comes to making 
conditional predictions. 
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Chart  7 shows the history of the current balance of payments and 
the public  sector' deficit  (PSD), each expressed as a percentage 
of GDP. There may have been a moment, at the end of the eighties, 
when the two deficits looked a little like "twins", but from the 
perspective  of 1994 this impression is largely dissipated. The PSD 
-  rose rapidly in the mid 7Os, with no counterpart deterioration  in 
3 
6We use  the public  sector  deficit  rather than  the  Federal 
deficit  since  for the purpose of economic analysis it is a matter 
of indifference whether any excess of spending over tax and other 
receipts derives from the activities of the Federal Government or 
of State and Local Government. During the last four years the two 
deficits have only differed by some .25%  of GDP, SO  the matter has 
little practical  importance. 11 
the  balance  of payments,  and the  same thing  happened  again  in the 
early  eighties.  And  a big  improvement  in the  external  balance  in 
the  second  half  of  the  eighties  occurred  without  any  lasting 
improvement  in  the  PSD.  Any  abiding  sense  of  the  deficits  being 
twins  is pretty  well  destroyed  by the experience  of the nineties, 
when  the  PSD  improved  but  the  balance  of  payments  deteriorated 
sharply. 
Now  the  difference  between  the PSD and the current  account  deficit 
is  related,  by  accounting  identity,  to  the  aggregate  spending 
behaviour  of  the  private  sector  relative  to  its  income.  Total 
national  income  is identically  equal  to tctal  private  expenditure 
plus  government  expenditure  plus  any surplus  of exports  and income 
received  from  abroad  less  imports.  Subtracting  transfers  (mainly 
taxes  and  interest  payments)  from both  sides  of  the  equation,  we 
have  that private  disposable  income  (GNP less taxes  and transfers) 
less  total  private  expenditure  (consumption  plus -'investment) is 
always  exactly  equal  to  the  PSD  (government  expenditure  less 
transfers)  less  the  balance  of payments  deficit.  The  gap  bet-tjeen 
total  disposable  income  and  expenditure  also  measures  the  net 
acquisition  of financial  assets  by the private  sector  (NAFA). 
As  the  NAFA  is  identically  equal  to  the  PSD  less  the  balance  of 
payments  deficit,  the two deficits  would be identical  twins  if, and 
only  if,  the  NAFA  were  always  zero;  they  would  look  quite  like 
twins  if NAFA  were  nearly  constant  as a proportion  of GDP. 12 
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In Chart  8, the NAFA  has been added  to the current  account  balance 
and  the  PSD  shown  in  the  previous  table,  and  it  is  immediately 
clear  that  this  flow has been  far from constant  as a proportion  of 
GDP.  It exceeded  7.5%  of GDP  in 1975, became  negative  in the  late 
seventies,  rose  to 5% in 1982,  fell below  zero  for three  years  in 
the  late  eighties,  rose  to 4% in 1990 and has  subsequently  fallen 
again  to  about  zero.  But  the  wide  range  of  fluctuation  does  not 
mean  there  is  no  pattern.  For  instance,  NAFA  as  a  share  of  GDP 
has,  apparently,  no  long  run  trend,  its  range  of  fluctuation  is 
limited  and,  on average,  it has been positive.  These properties  of 
the NAFA  lead,  by themselves,  to the important  conclusion  that the 
public  sector  deficit  will normally,  andon  averaae,  be at least as 
larae  as the  balance  of pavments  deficit. 
But  we can do much  better  than that  !  To understand  the pattern,  it 
is  first  useful  to  convert  NAFA  to  "real  terms"  using  standard 13 
inflation  accounting  methods'. Chart  9 below  plots  "real"  NAFA 
against a simple measure of the business cycle - the ratio of GDP 
to a fitted trend. An extremely clear pattern  now emerges; NAFA, 
the  surplus  of  total  private  income  over  expenditure,  has  very 
consistently  fluctuated in a counter-cyclical way. 
CHART  9 
-  dif CfahVgdp 
-  In(gdpMrend(ln(gdp)) 
&X&L  NAFfi 
The same data may alternatively be presented as in Chart 10 below, 
which  shows  real  disposable  income  and  total  real  private 
expenditure between 1970 and 1994, the vertical lines marking the 
peaks and troughs of each business Cycle. Private expenditure, as 
one  might  expect,  falls  relative  to  income  during  the peak  to 
trough periods and rises again during the trough to peak periods, 
partly because of the pattern of the investment cycle. 
’  ltReal"  NAFA is not, of course, equal to NAFA divided by a 
price  index;  it  is  NAFA  divided  by  a  price  index  less  the 
"inflation tax" times the opening real stock of financial assets. 
The adjustment  to real terms  makes a great deal of difference in 
periods  of high inflation such as 1975 and 1982. 14 
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In the  author's  view,  there  are good theoretical  and  empirical 
grounds for postulating a stable relationship between real private 
expenditure,  disposable  income  and  the real  stock  of  financial 
assets$. However for the purpose of this brief, a relatively weak 
e[perhaps there will be an appendix containing an up to date 
US version of this, the "New Cambridge" equation, first published 
using UK data nearly twenty years ago, for instance in Fetherston 
and Godley  (1978). The original formulation was wrong,  not on the 
grounds generally put forward at that time but because, in common 
most  (all?) other applied economists, we did not then understand 
inflation accounting. Alan Blinder  (1978)  who was critical of the 
New Cambridge  approach, neverthefess commented "To the credit of 
the  New  Cambridge  group....  the  one  feature  of  the  model  that 
Fetherston and Godley Clearly label as absolutely essential to New 
Cambridge  [the  one which it was our predominant concern to deploy!] 
is also the one feature that should elicit the greatest support on 
this  side  of the Atlantic:the unusual specification of aggregate 
private expenditure. I  rather doubt that the sum of consumption and 
investment  spending  can  be  very  well  explained  by  the  sum  of 
disposable  income and retained earnings, and its lagged value, in 
the  US.  But  if it can be, American Keynesians will  have to re- 15 
claim  will  be  enough  to  establish  a  presumption  of  great 
importance.  The  claim  is  that,  in  the  absence  of  cyclical 
fluctuations,  it  is  reasonable  to  expect  that  real  NAFA,  the 
private  sector's  surplus  of  real  income  over  real  expenditure, 
would  be  a some small, positive  and fairly  stable proportion  of 
GDP. Put round the other way, if there is a long run trend for the 
balance  of payments to deteriorate there will also be a long run 
trend  for PSD to deteriorate as Well. 
The  historical  relationship  between  the  budget  and  balance  of 
payments  deficits is SO  distorted by cyclical disturbances that a 
better  idea of the underlying position  is obtained by inspecting 
stocks of assets and liabilities instead of confining attention to 
the flows describing changes in stocks. 









-  UFADP 
-  DtXDP 
-1.. FmD? 
‘-  _.,..  .  .  pRpfj7-E  F/RP@lfi‘  h+fo  .  .._  ,.:._  .  ..’  ,, C-f!  .  .  .._.. 
.._._..”  .._ __...._. . . .  .  -a.._ 
.I. 
. . . . . . 
: 
: 
‘.  ._..........,._  _- 
1378  1980  1982  1984  19&  ma  1998  1392  1994 
examine the prevailing models of consumer and invest  :or  behaviour. 
An empirical study of this question 
-  ---L  in the US would be mosr;  welcome 
__- 1 ---, 
,  ,  and  would  really  decide  whether  there  is  anything  in  NW 
Cambridge  that we in America should import.] 16 
As levels  of asset and liability  stocks  are made up from increments 
over  long  periods  of time they are relatively  insensitive  to short 
term  cyclical  influences  and  we  should  expect  to  see  the  trend 
deterioration  in the balance  Of payments  generating  an increase  in 
public  sector  debt which does match  the rise in foreign  debt.  That 
a process  of this  kind has been  taking  place  is shown  in Chart  II, 
which  also  shows  how the net  stock  of financial  assets  has  indeed 
been  a  fairly  stable  proportion  of GDP,  at  least  during  the  last 
few  years.  People  should  perhaps  have  been  discussing  twin  debts 
rather  than  twin  deficits. 
THE  MEDIUM  TERM  PREDICAMENT 
The  following  section presents  some conditional  projections,  using 
a  range  of  assumptions  about  the  primary  balance,  real  interest 
rates,  real  growth  and  inflation.  These  are  in each  case  combined 
with the assumption,  (a  neccral  assumption  since the--whole  exercise 
abstracts  from cyclical  fluctuations)  that the NAFA  of the private 
sector  settles  down  at 0.6? of GDP.  This makes  it possible  to draw 
in the public  sector deficit  implied by the other components  ,of  zhe 
projection  since  this  is,  by  definition,  equal  to  the  clJrrent 
account  deficit  plus the private  surplus.  The reader  is warned  zhat 
the projections  which follcw are nothing more than the arithmetical 
consequences  of the assumpti  ons made  and therefore  that  they  have 
a  strictly  ex  ante  status.  This point  is smphasised  since  a;:  of 
them  describe  situations  which,  it is very  sincerely  hoped,  cculd 
never  really  happen. 
For Projection  I, illustrated  in Chart l-2,  she assumptions  made are 
as  follows.  The  primary  balance  share  improves  slightly  compared 
with  its  end  1994  level  and  remains  constant  at  2%  of  GDP 
thereafter;  the  growth  rate  of GDP  is 2.5%  per  annum  throughout; 
the  real  rate  of  interest  is  4.25%;  and  the  inflation  rate  is 
3.25%.  The  key assumptions  in this projection  are 17 
CHART12 
believed to be on the optimistic side, since it is assumed that the 
trend deterioration  in the primary balance comes to an abrupt halt 
in 1995 and is even reversed a little compared with end 1994; also 
the real rate of interest is assumed to be lower than at the time 
of writing  (January 1995, when the relevant real rate was about 
4.75%). 
Some of the main features of the projection are that outflows of 
factor income build up rapidly from the end of 1994, so that the 
current account deficit reaches 3% of GDP 1998, 4% in 2004 and 5% 
in 2010. The foreign debt to GDP-ratio, which was 8% at the end of 
1993,  rises  to  19%  in  1999, 30%  in  2_004  and  46%+in  2010.  The 
general government deficit, which is expected to come out at about 
2% in 1994, rises to 3% in 1997, 4% in 2000 and 5% in 2006. 
While  the projected government deficit comes out as the inevitable, 
logical,  implication  of the other balances  (the foreign deficit 
plus NAFA), its rise obviously has an economic rationale which must 18 
be  understood  if  the  whole  story  is  to  carry  plausibility.  A 
situation is being described in which the current account deficit 
is rising  rapidly while the growth Of output  is maintained  at a 
steady  2.5%  -  something  quite  close  to  the  normal  growth  of 
capacity. Yet the growing external deficit is bleeding the circular 
income  flow on  an ever  increasing scale,  so output  can only be 
sustained  if transfusions  are applied in the  form of comparably 
large, and increasing, net inflows from the government sector. This 
does not imply that the government would, in any ordinary sense, be 
pursuing  a profligate  fiscal policy  Since  most  of the  increased 
deficit would be taking the form of interest payments as government 
debt accumulated;  on plausible assumptions the  interest payments 
would be so large that a very severely restrictive  fiscal policy 
would be necessary, with rising taxes or severely curtailed  public 
expenditure. This last point is brought out quite dramatically  if 
the implications  of Table 12, which shows flow variables, are drawn 
for  stock  variables  as  shown  in  Table  13.  The  counterpart  of 
negative  net  stocks  of  foreign wealth worth  46%..-of  GDP  is that 
public  sector  debt  reaches about 60% of GDP. 
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Before  commenting on this projection, we show two others, in the 
first of which the assumptions are a little more favourable, in the 
second  a  little less. 
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Chart  14 assumes that the real rate of interest is 4% - well below 
its present  rate and only  1.5% more than the  rate  of growth of 
output,  while the primary balance improves quite perceptibly, to 
1.5%  from  1995  onwards.  Using  these  assumptions,  the  current 
account  deficit  is  considerably  lower  than  in  projection  I, 
reaching  3% in 2004 and 3.6% in 2010. The government deficit aLso 
rises  much  more  slowly, but  quite  inexorably,  reaching  3.5% by 
2004. The foreign debt rises to 20% in 2001, 25% in 2004 and 35% in  4 
2010. 20 




Finally,  Chart  15  assumes  that  the  real  interest  rate  is  4.6% 
(roughly  its present  level), while the primary  balance  deteriorates 
by  one  tenth  of a percentage  point  every  year. 
The  outcome  depicted  in  the  chart,  though  based  on  assumptions 
which,  taken  individually,  are  not  extreme,  is  something  of  a. 
horror  story.  The current  account  deficit  rises  to  4% in 1999,  5% 
in  2003  and  8.3%  in  2010.  The  government  deficit  rises  to  5%  in 
2000,  6.8%  in 2005 and 9% in 2010. The foreign  debt  rises to 20% in 




All  the  projections  described  in  the  previous  section  and 
illustrated  in  Charts  12  through  15  follow,  essentially,  from 
assumptions  about the future of the primary  balance  and real rates, 
of interest;  once these assumptions  have been made, everything  else 
follows  automatically  and  inevitably.  In the  author's  view,  there 21 
is nothing  exaggerated  about these  assumptions.  Even the worst case 
shown  (in Chart  15) uses assumptions  which,  taken individually,  are 
well  within  the  bounds  of possibility.  The  course  of  the  primary 
balance  in  this  projection  looks  very  like  a continuation  of the 
adverse  trend  which has been  in evidence  for the last fifteen  years 
or  so.  And  there  must  be  a  serious  possibility, 
current  account  deficit  and the net debt  really  get 
shown  in  the  chart,  that  the  real  rate  of  interest 
levels  well  above  those  assumed. 
Yet  each  of these  simulations,  even  the  "best"  one 
should  the  US 
as bad  as that 
would  rise  to 
shown  in Chart 
12, describe  situations  which are, in the technical  sense unstable, 
that  is  to  say  they  imply  an accumulation  of debt  which  is on  an 
explosive  path.  The point  is really  an obvious  one  which  needs  no 
formal  expression  in algebra  or elaborate  language.  A country  which 
is in debt  cannot,  in the end, pay  interest  on its debts  except  by 
having  the  value  of  its  exports  exceed  the  value  of  its  imports. 
The  only  alternative  to  paying  interest  by  sell-ing goods  and 
services  is  to  pay  interest  by  borrowing  on  a  scale  which  grows 
without  limit.  Even foreign  aid provided  by the US would have to be 
borrowed  from  other  countries.  As  a  debtor  nation,  the  US  must 
eventually  attain  a  surplus  in  its  primary  balance.  Anyone  who 
disputes  this  must  reckon with the reductio  ad absurdum  question  - 
is  there  no  limi.1  whatever  to  the  permissible  extent  of 
indebtedness?  Could  it be 100% of GDP  ? Or 5005? The only legitimate 
questions  are  when,  to  what  extent  and  by  what  means  a  primarl 
surplus  has  to be  achieved. 
It  is  sometimes  supposed  that  a-  strategic  problem  of  the  kind 
adumbrated  will  be solved  automatically  and relatively  painlessly 
if market  forces  are allowed  free play.  I know  of no theory  which 22 
explains  just how the automatic  mechanism  is supposed  to workg, but 
the  view  is  decisively  confuted  by  the  fact  that  many  countries 
have,  in  the  past,  run  up  international  debts  which  did  indeed 
threaten  to generate  explosive  interest  payments  and which  did, as 
a  consequence,  force  those  countries  into  painful  retrenchment 
programmes. 
Some economists,  including  in particular  Robert Eisner,  dismiss the 
matter  on the grounds  that the real burden  of foreign  indebtedness 
is  so  small,  at  least  until  it  reaches  levels  enormously  higher 
than  it is today,  that the whole  thing  can be  ignored.  The core of 
the  Eisner  argument  is that  it will  alwayS  be  a sufficient  target 
to  keep  any  particular  level  of debt  conscant  as  a proportion  of 
GDP,  and  that  to  meet  this  target  it  is  only  necessary  to  run  a 
primary  surplus  equal  to  about  2%"  of  the  debt.  In  other  words, 
if  the  debt  were  as  high  as  30+  of  GD?,  the  primary  surplus 
necessary  to maintain  stability  would only be 0.6% of GDP; and even 
if  the  debt  got  to  100%  of  GDP,  the primary  surplus  needed  would 
only  be  2% of GDP;  and these  numbers  look small. 
However,  in the  contention  of this brief,  the notion  that  it will 
always  be  a sufficient  tarGet  of policy  to  stabilise  the  debt  to 
GDP ratio,  however  hicrh  the debt ratio mav oe, is defective  because 
it iqnores  the  fact that,  even  after  "stab:lity"  has been achieved 
there  remains  a  balance  of  payments  deficit  which  needs  to  be 
financed;  and the larger the debt, the larger will be this  current 
'There is a textbook  story  which  defines  an  "equilibrium"  as 
a situation  in which enough  capital  is flowing  into the country  to 
balance  any  current  account  deficit.  But_  this  perversely  ignores 
the  fact that  so long as there  is a current  account  deficit  stocks 
of liabilities  must be in process  of depletion  - a situation  which 
it is a travesty  to call  "equilibrium". 
"Precisely,  the  percentage  must  be  the  excess  of  the  real  , 
interest  rate  over  the  real  growth  rate.  Most  people  seem  to 
accept,  as a  "stylised  fact",  that  2+ is a reasonable  estimate  of 
this  excess  under  normal  circumstances. 23 
account  deficit.  For  suppose  there  is a debt  equal  to  100%  of GDP 
and  that  this  is  assumed,  according  to  the  Eisner  definition  of 
stability,  to  be  rising  at  the  same  rate  as  GDP;  suppose 
furthermore  that  nominal  GDP is rising  at, say 6% per annum,  (2.5% 
real  growth  plus  3.5%  inflation).  Then  in this  "stable"  situation, 
while  there  is,  by  assumption,  a primary  surplus  equal  to  2%  of 
GDP,  there  is also  a current  account  deficit  equal  to 6% of GDP1'  - 
the  amount  of the  increase  in the debt  - and this  is a sum which 
must  be  borrowed  year  in, year  out.  Parenthetically,  it  is to be 
noted  in  confirmation  of this  that  countries  which  have  actually 
reached  the  crisis  point  (Ireland  and  Denmark  both  provide  good 
examples)  have  not  been  content  merely  to  achieve  stability  in 
their  debt  ratio.  They  have  gone  a  long  way  further  and  run 
enormous  primary  deficits  which  have  had  the  effect  of  bringing 
their  debt  ratios  down. 
Perhaps  it  is the  magnitude  of the  current  account  deficit  which 
must  be  assumed  to  persist  in  any  "stable"  situation  which  will 
give  us a criterion  for judging what the maximum  debt  ratio can be. 
Surely  a  stable  debt  ratio  of  lOOR,  implying  a  current  account 
deficit  (i.e. financing  requirement)  equal  to 6% of GDP looks very 
dangerously  large.  Even  a  debt  ratio  stable  at  509,  implying  a 
primary  surplus  equal  tc  1%  of  GDP  and  a current  account  deficit 
equal  to  3% of GDP,  looks  too large to be  safe. 
It  is  very  tentatively  suggested  that  the  highest  debt  ratio  on 
which  strategic  polic;  car.  prudently  be  based  might  be  in  the 
!:  It is possible  to get into.an  argument  at this point  about 
nominal  vs  real  interest  rates.  According  to  one  system  of 
concepts,  it is an exaggeration  to say that the balance  of payments 
deficit  in the  example  given  would  be  6% it ignores  the  fact that 
inflation  is eroding  the stock of debt. While the point  is formally 
correct  it doesn't  help with the financing problem  which would have 
to be  faced  on the  ground.  If you have to borrow  $425 billion  (6% 
of GDP),  potential  lenders  will not be  impressed  by the  fact that 
"in  real  terms"  your  stock  of debt  is only  going  up by  half  that 
amount. 24 
region  of 25%,  in which  case  the primary  surplus  would  have  to be 
about  0.5 of GDP and the current  account  deficit  about  1.5%. There 
is, indeed,  reason  to suppose  that this may be too sloppy  a target. 
For 
a) With  net foreign  debts  about $1.75 trillion  (i-e 25% of today's 
GDP))  and  a  foreign  borrowing  requirement  running  at  about  $100 
billion  per annum, the US would be vulnerable,  much more vulnerable 
than  at  present,  to  bouts  of  speculation  against  the  dollar. 
Interest  rates  would  most  likely have to be raised  to levels which 
would  prove  damaging  to  investment  and  growth.  And  the  US  would 
have  undergone  a  serious  and  permanent  loss  of  power  in  the 
international  scene. 
b)  For  reasons  set  out  earlier  in  this  brief,  if  there  were 
foreign  indebtedness  equal  to  25%  of  GDP,  the  government  sector 
would  have  become  indebted  to  at  least  the  same  extent,  with 
ruinous  consequences  for  the  public  sector's  finances.  The 
Government  would  have  to  find  some  3%  of  GDP  ($2.00  billion  at 
today's  values)  simply  to meet  its interest  obligations. 
Yet the  dubiously  "sustainable"  situation  just described,  with the 
foreign  debt  ratio  held  constant  at  255,  is  one  in  which  the 
primarv  balance  is  assumed  to  have  been  transformed  from  its 
present  minus  2.5%  of GDP  EC  about  DlUS  0.5%". 
We  are  reaching  a the conci  'usion that  it is not  a moment  too  soon 
to  bring  the  improvement  of  the primary  balance  to  the  forefront 
among  the  objectives  of economic  policy.  The  following  two graphs 
present  aspects  of a barely  acceptable  scenario,  which  yet assumes 
that  the  primary  balance  improves  steadily  from  19‘96 onwards, 
reaching  the small surplus adequate  to stabilise  the growth of debt 
in the  year  2002. 
'*That is  the  real  rate  of  interest  (4.5b?)  less  the  growth 
rate  (2.5%?) times  the assumed  debt ratio  (27") CHART16 
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Chart  17 shows  the implications  of the simulation  shown 
for asset  and  liability  stocks. 
CHART  17 
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The  improvement  depicted  in  the  previous  two  charts  is, it is 
suggested, something like the minimum acceptable. The foreign debt 
stabilises at about 20% of GDP, SO  the running balance of payments 
deficit is under 1.5% at the end, which is probably small enough to 
present no financing problem. And the public sector debt stabilises 
at about 35% which is not too far from its present  level. 
To show how important it iS to get an early and rapid improvement 
we add a final simulation which shows what happens if the primary 
balance  only gets into surplus in the year 2008. 
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The  story  depicted  in  this  simulation  is  almost  certainly 
unacceptable.  Ignoring  the  possibility  that  en  route  to  the 
"stable" situation,  the stra  tegy is blown off course by a series of 
exchange crises, we end up with an abiding current account deficit 
nearly  2%  of GDP and a public debt ratio of about  45%. In this 
world, interest payments on the public sector debt would be well in 
excess  of the public deficit  itself, implying an extremely tough 
fiscal stance in the form of onerous combination of tax increases 
and cuts in public expenditure. 
IS THE ADJUSTMENT  "LARGE"? 
It has occasionally been suggested that the scale of the change in 
the primary balance which (by  common consent) will at some stage be 
necessary,  is  so  small that  it will not be  either  particularly 
difficult or particularly painful to achieve it. After all, we are  I 
only  talking  about  the  transfer  of  2.5-3.5%  of  GDP  "into" the 
balance of trade. 28 
Such  a suggestion  is probably  inappropriate  because,  with  exports 
and  imports  of  goods  and  services  only  about  11%  of  GDP,  it  is 
necessary,  in order  to  improve  the primary  balance  by,  say,  3% of 
GDP  to  get  exports  to  rise  very  substantially  - by  nearly  30%  - 
relative  to  imports;  alternatively  it would  do  if imports  fell by 
the  same  proportion  relative  to exports.  Moreover,  the  sectors  of 
the  US economy  producing  potentially  tradeable  goods  and  services 
has now  shrunk  to probably  not more  than  30% of GDP.  So what  looks 
like  a small  transfer  of resources  when  expressed  as a proportion 
of GDP,  looks  much bigger  as a proportion  of tradeables.  2.58-3.55 
of GDP  turns  into  8-12%  of the tradeable  sector. 
AND  HOW  WOULD  THE  TRANSFER  BE MADE? 
There  are  alternative  routes  to  a  solution  to  the  problems 
described  in  this  brief  which  would  have  drastically  different 
consequences  for  the  US economy  and  for the  rest  of  the  world  as 
well.  .; 
On the  one hand  there  is the deflationarv  solution  associated  with 
tax increases  and expenditure  cuts. This is the solution  habitually 
adopted  by debtor  countries,  often under the pressure  from the IMF. 
One way of getting  imports to fall the necessary  (say) 20::  relative 
to exports  is to make the GDP  fall by a sufficiently  large amount. 
Most  researchers  have  found that there is a high  income  elasticity 
of demand  for  imports  in the US; a common  finding  is that  imports 
respond  proportionately  around  1.5  times  as  much  as  changes  in 
output.  According  to  such  arithmetic,  a  fall  of  12.5%  in  GDP 
(implying  a  rise  of  65  in unemployment?)  might  be  sufficient  to 
reduce  imports  by the required  amount. The_zrouble  with'this  story, 
however,  is  that  a  fall  of  2Ok  in  US  imports  would  give  such  a 
disinflationary  shock  to rest of the world that we that  US exports 
would  be  adversely  affected.  So the  reduction  in US  output  would 
have  to  be  even  greater  to  get  the  needed  improvement  in  the 
primary  balance.  Of  course  the  US  budget  problem,  if  it  is  a 29 
problem,  would be solved,  but only at the cost of severe  depression 
both  here  and throughout  the  world. 
The alternative  to solving  the problem  by deflation  is to solve it 
by  expenditure  switchina  policies  which  would  by  hook  or by crook 
increase  the value  of US exports  or reduce  the import propensity  of 
the  US  economy.  If  expenditure  switching  could  successfully  be 
brought  about  on  a  large  enough  scale,  all  the  main  problems 
adumbrated  in this  brief  could  be solved  without  any  deflationary 
impulse  being  imparted  to the US economy.  The net effect  of adding 
to  exports  while  reducing  the  propensity  to  import  would  be  to 
simultaneously  add  to domestic  output,  reduce  the  primary  balance 
of  payments  and  also  (through  its  benign  effect  on  the  net  tax 
yield)  reduce the public  sector deficit. Expenditure  switching may, 
indeed,  be  the  only  way  the public  sector  deficit  can be  reduced, 
or even  eliminated,  without  any  increases  in tax  rates  or cuts in 
public  expenditure. 
ENVOI 
Why  is  there  such  a  quietist  attitude  in  the  US  to  the  problems 
described  in  this  brief?  Perhaps  with  interest  payments  on  the 
foreign  debt  only  recently  turned  negative,  and  the  financing  ,af 
the  current  account  deficit  (so far) not a serious  problem,  there 
is simply  not enough  unpleas  ancness at hand to generate  significant 
concern,  particularly  when  there  is so much  else  to worry  about". 
"This  plus  a  national  habit  of  thinking  as  though  the  US 
economy  is  closed  -  a  habit  sponsored,  seemingly,  by  the  way 
macroeconomics  is  habitually  taught.  For  instance,  two  of  the 
leading  graduate  textbooks  (Sargent and Blanchard  & Fischer)  deal 
only  with  the closed  economy.  So far as undergraduate  texts go, it 
is unusual  to find stock  variables  other than the stock  of "money" 
mentioned  at all - so these  tests cannot  be very  helpful  with the 
problem  of indebtedness. 